MATRIX OF TRUTH, THE GOOD AND BEAUTY by 山川 偉也 et al.
IA. N. Whitehead, who acknowledged himself as a spiritual successor of Plato, developed in his
Process and Reality a bold and profound cosmology based substantially on Plato’s metaphysical
thought in the dialogue Timaeus. He did not only formulate that famous phrase characterizing the
European philosophical tradition as “a series of footnotes to Plato,” but also recognized his own
“Philosophy of Organism” as a version of ‘Plato’s general point of view with the least changes.’2)
Here I quote some passages in the Process and Reality, which may remind us vividly the meta-
physical framework of the Platonic cosmology in the Timaeus.
‘The actualities constituting the process of the world are conceived as exemplifying the
ingression (or ‘participation’) of other things which constitute the potentialities of
definiteness for any actual existence. The things which are temporal arise by their participa-
tion in the things which are eternal. The two sets are mediated by a thing which combines
the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential. This final entity
is the divine element in the world, by which the barren insufficient disjunction of abstract
potentialities obtains primordially the efficient conjunction of ideal realization.’3)
‘The origin of the present cosmic epoch is traced back to an aboriginal disorder,...’4)
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1) Acknowledgements: This is a revised version of my paper ‘Matrix of the Good’ which was read in the
session of The First World Olympic Congress of Philosophy, Athens and Spetses, 27/June3/August/
2004.
2) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, an Essay in Cosmology, Macmillan Company 1929; Harper
Torchbook edition 1960, p. 63.
3) Op. cit., pp. 6364.
4) Op. cit., p. 146.
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‘For the Timaeus, the creation of the world is the incoming of a type of order establishing a
cosmic epoch.’5)
The above quotations altogether correspond straightforwardly to the metaphysical framework
of the Platonic cosmology in the Timaeus which narrates the role of the Demiurge in the creation
of the cosmos and the necessity of the third kind () which makes its appearance between
(1) a kind of paradigm and (2) an image of a paradigm (48e49a).
The Process and Reality as an epoch-making philosophical achievement in the twentieth cen-
tury, I believe, exemplifies par excellence the vitality of Plato’s philosophical thinking. Thus we can
safely say that Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism is a typical case which testifies a fact that
Plato’s conception in the Timaeus has still an extraordinary power to provoke the modern intel-
lects into building their great metaphysical theories.
In the following, I want to show you some similar cases that Japanese philosophers too were
enlightened by Plato’s insight; I mean the cases of Fujisawa Norio6) and Nishida .7) They
too, being encouraged and guided by Plato’s conception of “	,” developed their original ideas.
Fujisawa8) presented a fresh interpretation of Plato’s later philosophy; and Nishida, a contempo-
rary of Whitehead, developed a bold metaphysical viewpoint which might be regarded as an
achievement ranking with M. Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit.
II
To illuminate the point of Fujisawa’s achievement, let me refer again a little while to White-
head’s words which I have just quoted: ‘The things which are temporal arise by their participation
in the things which are eternal.’ The purport of this expression could be paraphrased by another
expression that ‘the actualities constituting the process of the world are conceived as exemplifing
the ingression (or ‘participation’) of other things which constitute the potentialities of
definiteness for any actual existence.’ Both expressions refer to a situation where an ‘actual
entity’ as the final real thing of the world arises.
In Platonic terms, it is the case that a sensible particular (x) participates in the Form (
))
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( ingression (or ‘participation’) of other things
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5) Ibid.
6) Fujisawa Norio, 19252004.
7) Nishida , 18701945.
8) He deceased recently (February, 2004).
9) Whitehead’s technical terms: ‘the things which are temporal’ (=actual entities) and ‘the things which
are eternal’ (=the eternal objects) correspond respectively to Plato’s ‘the sensible particulars’ and ‘the
Forms’.
which constitute the potentialities,’ and in that case, if the “ingression” appearing in this context
may be regarded as a case that a particular field in Space-Time participates immediately in the
eternal object itself,10) it seems, the unbridgeable chasm between Plato’s and Aristotle’s meta-
physics, which has been covered by Whitehead’s integration between them, will rise to the
surface.
In spite of Whitehead’s intention to unify the both philosophers’ metaphysical principles,11)
there was in reality a discordant element between Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions about indi-
viduals; in reality, Aristotle at Phys.2. 209b1113, based on his conception of the substance and
matter, severely criticized Plato in respect of his “confusion” between “place” and “matter.” He
said: ‘For this reason Plato also says in the Timaeus that matter (

) and space (	
) are
the same, for that which is capable of receiving (
) and space are one and the same.’
It is on this occasion that Fujisawa criticized Aristotle. In his paper ‘ ’ヽand
Idioms of “Paradeigmatism”’12) Fujisawa insisted as follows:
‘Nothing could be more instructive in this connection than to observe that Aristotle, identi-
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10) Whitehead in his book Adventures of Ideas refers to the case very often; Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Adventures
of Ideas, The Free Press, New York, 1961, pp. 122, 134, 135, 147, 150, 201, 275. Cf. especially p. 150,
where he says as follows:
‘We speak in the singular of The Universe, of Nature, of which can be translated as Process.
There is the one all-embracing fact which is the advancing history of the one Universe. This commu-
nity of the world, which is the matrix for all begetting, and whose essence is process with retention
of connectedness, this community is what Plato terms the Receptacle (

). In our effort to di-
vine his meaning, we must remember that Plato says that it is an obscure and difficult concept, and that
in its own essence the Receptacle is devoid of all forms. It is thus certainly not the ordinary geomet-
rical space with its mathematical relations. Plato calls his Receptacle ‘The foster-mother of all becom-
ing’. He evidently conceived it as a necessary notion without which our analysis of Nature is defective.
It is dangerous to neglect Plato’s intuitions. He carefully varies his phrases in referring to it, and im-
plies that what he says is to be taken in its most abstract sense. The Receptacle imposes a common
relationship on all that happens, but does not impose what that relationship shall be. It seems to be a
somewhat more subtle notion than Aristotle’s “matter” which, of course, is not the “matter” of Galileo
and Newton. Plato’s Receptacle may be conceived as the necessary community within which the
course of history is set, in abstraction from all the particular historical facts. I have directed attention
to Plato’s doctrine of The Receptacle because, at the present moment, physical science is nearer to it
than at any period since Plato’s death. The space-time of modern mathematical physics, conceived in
abstraction from the particular mathematical formula’ which applies to the happenings in it, is almost
exactly Plato’s Receptacle. It is to be noted that mathematical physicists are extremely uncertain as to
what these formula are exactly, nor do they believe that any such formulae can be derived from the
mere notion of space-time. Thus, as Plato declares, space-time in itself is bare of all forms.’
11) Op. cit., p. 147. ‘Both for Plato and for Aristotle the process of the actual world has been conceived as
a real incoming of forms into real potentiality, issuing into that real togetherness which is an actual thing.
Also, for the Timaeus, the creation of the world is the incoming of a type of order establishing a cosmic
epoch. It is not the beginning of matter of fact, but the incoming of a certain type of social order.’
12) Phronesis, vol. XIX, no. 1 (1974).
fying Platonic with ‘matter,’ applied to it again the term ‘the participant’ (	

		) in relation to the Forms. For this would show that Aristotle was inevi-
tably led, by his basic metaphysics of the individual particular (	) and the material sub-
strate, to ignore all the above-mentioned points of Plato’s conception of and to
reintroduce automatically into that conception the ‘x’ (=	～) as the subject-
substrate and, with it, reinstate the discharged 		terminology in its former office of
describing the relation to the Forms. Furthermore, his supposition that, if the participant is
place, the Forms themselves must be in place, clearly indicates that Aristotle took this
locution, “Space participates in ”, which is itself an unwarranted, non-Platonic locution, to
mean “is in Space” (which is equivalent to “Space has (		)”), and that he did not take
any account of F, likeness or image of , which Plato says is what in fact enters into the
Space.
Whereas they say that the problem of individuation was initially discovered and solved by
Aristotle,13) according to Fujisawa, Plato was consistently pursuing to question the ultimate status
of ‘x’ and to elaborate the logic of “Paradeigmatism” that points to the “final answer” in the
Timaeus which will be summarized as follows:14)
(1) Plato intended to dissolve “this some-thing” x, which had been figuring as the subject
of the ‘participation’ terminology.
(2) His efforts bore fruit at the passage dealing with the Receptacle of all becoming which
is finally called “Space” ().
(3) Plato rejected finally both of the view of the physical world as a realm of subsisting
things and of the locution using “this thing” (～	) as its subject;
(4) As an alternative to “		” locution he recommended the way of speaking of the
phenomena in terms of F and (and Space), without referring to x.15)
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13) For the recent approach to this problem, Cf. M. M. McCabe, Plato’s Individuals, Princeton University
Press, 1994, pp. 3 ff. Concerning the Platonic solution of this problem in the Timaeus, McCabe regards it
as an unsuccessful one; cf. pp. 162ff.
14) I sum the eight points, which Fujisawa displays up succinctly, and condense into four items.
15) It is noteworthy that Fujisawa insists that even in the middle period Plato thought that ‘x’ is something
to be dissolved in the final analysis. He says:
‘Yet we must firmly bear in mind that this distinction, namely the distinction between ‘thing’ and
‘quality’, ‘substance’ and ‘attribute’, x (or Fx) and F, cannot, even in the Phaedo, have ultimate and fun-
damental significance for Plato’s theory, just because ‘x’ is something to be dissolved in the final analy-
sis. The distinction which is and will remain ultimate and fundamental in Plato’s theory is, of course,
the distinction between F and. And if so, the way of description which is and will remain fundamental
in Plato’s theory must be the one which, without mentioning ‘x’ as the subject-thing-substance, just
Thus, according to Fujisawa, the locution “This (x) is beautiful (F)” in everyday language
would be in a “philosopher’s version” equivalent to that “In this part of Space the Form of Beauty
() is imaged (F)”, or “An image (F) of the Form of Beauty () has now come into this part
of Space”, or, further, “This part of Space has now received an image (F) of the Form of Beauty
(),” and so on according as the images () come into Space. But, it is not the case that
Forms themselves come into Space.
‘While using such expressions as “receive” (	
) and “enter or come into” (



),’ Fujisawa says, ‘Plato is emphatic in asserting that the Form and the Space, the two
permanent separate kinds of being, cannot be one in the other and therefore what “comes into”
Space or what Space “receives” is not  itself but F, an image or likeness of the Form, which,
owing to the Space, can “somehow cling to existence” as and escape being nothing at all
(
).’
The above mentioned Fujisawa’s contention might be considered to have some issues to be
examined carefully.16) And a part of the problem has its essential relevance to the matter which
Whitehead called “the final platonic problem.”17) Nevertheless, Fujisawa’s contention has its own
weight. Namely, it has its relevance to “the problem of Value and its relation to Being,” because
of a fact that ‘“this thing” as subject-substrate, x, is in itself axiologically “neutral” and hence to
hold such xs in some form or other to be ultimate factors in the world would seem to exclude
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describes the F- relation, namely the ‘paradeigma’ idioms, not those of ‘participation’ which
require ‘x’ as the indispensable subject of description.’
16) Once I myself criticized a part of Fujisawa’s contention dealing with “
	
” locution and the problem
concerning the specification of “this part” in the sentence of “Philosopher’s version” such as ‘In this part
of Space the Form of Beauty () is imaged (F),’ immediately after when his Phronesis article made its
appearance. See Fujisawa’s note in the last part of his Japanese version of his paper ‘ 	

	
.’
17) Whitehead in Process and Reality, p. 52 says as follows:
‘Interplay between the thing which is static and the things which are fluent involves contradiction at
every step in its explanation. Such philosophies must include the notion of “illusion” as a fundamental
principle the notion of “mere appearance.” This is the final platonic problem.’
However, it is a noteworthy fact that Fujisawa criticizes Whitehead in Process and Reality who regarded
Plato as a conspirator of Descartes and insisted that:
‘The exclusive dominance of the substance-quality metaphysics was enormously promoted by the logi-
cal bias of the mediaeval period. It was retarded by the study of Plato and of Aristotle. These authors
included the strains of thought which issued in this doctrine, but included them inconsistently mingled
with other notions. The substance-quality metaphysics triumphed with exclusive dominance in Des-
cartes’ doctrines.’
See also Fujisawa’s comment to Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, Cambridge, at the University Press,
1964, p. 24, where again Whitehead ascribes the erroneous presupposition of the “subject-predicate” or the
“substance-quality” (attribute) to Plato. See Fujisawa’s Japanese paper ‘Whitehead and Plato’ in Collected
Papers of Fujisawa Norio, Iwanami, 2001, Vol. 6, pp. 107ff.
values from the basic reality in the world and dissociate Being from Value.’
Now, as you may appreciate immediately, Fujisawa here is referring to a fact that Aristotle in
the Nicomachean Ethics18) and Eudemian Ethics19) criticized severely Plato’s conception of the
“Form of Good” resulting in the decisive dissociation between Being and Value.20)
III
By the way, it is an interesting fact that Fujisawa has shared his concern for the problem of
“Value” and its relation to “Being” with Whitehead. Whitehead in Science and the Modern World
accused ‘the fixed scientific cosmology’ which presupposed ‘the ultimate fact of an irreducible
brute matter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux of configurations.’ He said:
‘In itself such a material is senseless, valueless, purposeless. It just does what it does do,
following a fixed routine imposed by external relations which do not spring from the nature
of its being. It is this assumption that I call “scientific materialism.” Also it is an assumption
which I shall challenge as being entirely unsuited to the scientific situation ...’21)
For Whitehead the problem in question had its relevance to the “immediate experience” on
which the Philosophy of Organism must be based.
‘Our datum is the actual world, including ourselves; and this actual world spreads itself for
observation in the guise of the topic of our “immediate experience. The elucidation of imme-
diate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the starting point for thought
is the analytic observation of components of this experience.’22)
Here on this junction I want to turn to another Japanese philosopher Nishida. The central idea
pervading throughout his first book An Inquiry into the Good was “pure experience,” which
straightforwardly corresponds to Whitehead’s “immediate experience” and which Nishida called
in the preface to the first edition “the ground of my thought,” i.e., ‘the starting point from which
his ideas developed and the point to which every development, both his individual ideas and his
thought as a whole, returns.’23) For Nishida too the “pure” experience was the aboriginal starting
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18) Cf. Vol. I, chapter 6.
19) Cf. Vol. I, chapter 8.
20) For the recent assessment of Aristotle’s criticism of the Form of the Good, Cf. G. Santas, Goodness and
Justice, Plato, Aristotle, and the Moderns, Blackwell, 2001, pp. 194ff.
21) Cf. Science and the Modern World, Lowell Lectures, 1925, The Macmillan Company, 1928, pp. 2526.
22) Cf. Process and Reality, p. 6.
23) Cf. Nishitani Keiji, Nishida, Translated by Yamamoto Seisaku & James W. Heisig, Introduction by
point of his philosophy:24)
‘When one experiences directly one’s conscious state there is as yet neither subject nor
object, and knowledge and its object are completely united. This is the purest form of
experience.’
Now, it is significant to appreciate that even in this maiden work Nishida, though it was still in
a primordial way, had already a foreseeing idea of “topos” which will be fully developed and bear
fruit in his later works beginning from his monumental work ‘Basho’ (topos). In respect of this,
Nishitani Keiji, an important disciple and successor of Nishida, epitomized the points as
follows:25)
‘In short, facts, the knowledge of facts, and the actual presence of the self all become imme-
diately one in [pure] experience. ... It is from the locus of pure experience that the stand-
point develops at which true knowing, true reality, and true goodness appear in their original
form and at which they can be examined with appreciation. Moreover, it is also the stand-
point that leads to unity with God.’ ... This kind of intuitive experience forms the foundation
on which all of our knowledge must be built up.’
The pass to Plato’s “” was, indeed, already at his close quarters, in the notion of “pure
experience;” that is, in “the ground” of Nishida’s thought. The idea of “basho” (topos) came to
him when he was struggling to overcome the epistemological stance dwelled on the “subject-
object” split. His fundamental intuition, that bore fruit in his monumental paper “Basho” in June
1926, came from his attention to Plato’s conception of the “third kind” in the Timaeus (52b),
where he read the sentence that ‘it is somehow necessary that all that exists should exist “in
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D. S. Clark, Jr., University of California Press, 1991, p. 93.
24) Nishida , A Study of Good, V. H. Viglielmo, tr. (Tokyo: printing Bureau, Japanese Government,
1960), pp. 12. Cf. also Robert E. Carter, The Nothingness beyond God, An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Nishida , Paragon House, New York, 1989, p. 1.
25) ‘The book opens with the sentence, “To experience means to know facts just as they are.” These words
express aptly the essence of [pure] experience. The term “facts as they are” means that [pure] experi-
ence is the locus where facts are given most immediately, while “knowing facts as they are” means that
[pure] experience is the locus where knowing arises most immediately. Or we might say that [pure]
experience is the fountainhead for both the objectivity of facts as they are and the certainty of knowing what
there is to know. The two come together most immediately in [pure] experience, at the point where facts
are “as they are.” If we refer to the unity of the objectivity of facts and the certainty of knowing as “fac-
ticity,” then “as they are” is the locus of the most immediate facticity.’ Cf. Nishitani Keiji, Nishida 	

Translated by Yamamoto Seisaku & James W. Heisig, Introduction by D. S. Clarke, Jr., University of
California Press, 1991, pp. 95ff. The letters within [ ] are my own.
some place” (	 ) and occupying “some space” (
)’ (52b).26) However, it is a
noteworthy fact that the “basho” was for Nishida, above all, a topological metaphor for the work-
ings of the subsumptive function of consciousness.27)
As early as 1905, when he was 26 years old, Nishida had been interested in the philosophical
discussion revolving around “pure experience” led by William James and later Henri Bergson.28)
And four years later, in July 1909, Nishida published ‘God and the World,’29) the gist of which
remind us vividly Whitehead’s sayings about the relation between God and the world. In reality,
Nishida in this essay views God’s nature from the unified standpoint of “pure experience” as
though he were Whitehead in Process and Reality, who did not regard “mind” and “matter” as two
independent substances but explained them just as two poles of the same “actual entity”30) and
willingly took part in Bergson, William James, and John Dewy.31)
And in later years, when The Third Philosophical Essays was published, Nishida in its preface,
looking back to his own philosophical achievement, said as follows:32)
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26) Nishida adopted a Japanese word “basho” to designate Plato’s “” which is said to receive the images
of the Form with some qualifications. It is notable however that Nishida says that ‘what I call “basho” is of
course not identical with Plato’s “Khora,” “receptacle,” and so forth.
27) In his letter to Mutai Risaku, he explained his aim of the article ‘Basho’:
‘This essay, “Basho,” is not yet clear, but what I endeavored to do was to define consciousness logi-
cally as “that which becomes the grammatical predicate and not the grammatical subject” over against
Aristotle’s definition of “substance,” ... while the grammatical subject, in its transcendence, endlessly
moves in the direction of the particular, the grammatical predicate, in its transcendence, endlessly
moves in the direction of the universal. When the latter direction becomes identical with the universal,
we arrive at “nothingness” that embraces being, that which purely mirrors, or that which is material
and yet contains what Plotinus called “the One” (to hen). When the grammatical predicate transcends
itself to the infinite maximum limit and loses itself, the grammatical subject reaches the apex of par-
ticularity and becomes that which sees it in itself. ... Unfortunately, in the present paper I did not ex-
pound on these ideas in detail. Anyway, with the idea of the topos I feel I have reached the philosophical
goal that I have been groping for. I shall try to reconstruct my previous ideas from the perspective of
“basho”.’
The above quoted sentence refers to Plotinus’ “

.” Though it might arouse our interest somehow,
here I want to note another fact that Nishida’s conception of “basho” was motivated by his initial interest
to “pure experience.” See Yusa Michiko, Zen & Philosophy, An Intellectual Biography of Nishida 	
University of Hawai’i Press, 2002, p. 205.
28) See Yusa, Op. cit., pp. 9697.
29) The content of this essay was later incorporated into the chapter 4 of the Zen no Kenkyu¯ (An Inquiry
into the Good), the maiden work of Nishida.
30) Cf. Science and the Modern World, pp. 102 ff.
31) Except for many reference to Bergson and William James, Whitehead in his ‘Preface’ of the Process and
Reality expresses his indebtedness to them and says: ‘I am also greatly indebted to Bergson, William James,
and John Dewy. One of my preoccupations has been to rescue their type of thought from the charge of anti-
intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been associated with it.’
32) Translation by Yusa Michiko; cf. Michiko Yusa, Zen & Philosophy, An Intellectual Biography of Nishida
	University of Hawai’ I Press, Honolulu, 2002, pp. 301304. Nishida wrote this preface when he was
70 years old.
‘Since my first book, An Inquiry into the Good [1911], my aim has been to approach things
from the most immediate and most fundamental standpoint [“pure experience”], and my
goal has been to capture this standpoint, from which everything emerges and to which eve-
rything returns. ... I grappled with this problem until I found a clue in my essay, “Basho
()” [1926]. [Initially] I was guided by Aristotle’s conception of the “	
	.”
However, Aristotle’s logic, where the grammatical subject holds the central place, cannot
deal with the reality of the self. ...The self, as the unifier of consciousness, can be conceived
as the self-determination of the field of consciousness [= the judging universal”] “topol-
ogically.” ... [Yet] when we consider even the universal itself to be topological, there must
be something that transcends the universal itself. ... But the most fundamental and compre-
hensive universal, from which everything emerges and to which everything returns, is some-
thing like the “expressive universal.” ... [Thus] in contrast to Aristotle’s logic of the
grammatical subject or Kant’s objective logic, I thought about the most fundamental and con-
crete universal, one that can also explain the activities of the self. But the universal that
allows that which is thoroughly individual to be conceivable is the universal in which the
many and the one are contradictorily self-identical, that is, it must be “the dialectical unive
rsal.” ... What I earlier called the “topos” is this dialectical universal; it is the world of contra-
dictory self-identity. [I call this “Nothingness (無 Mu).”] ... From this perspective, all that
exists is “being” and “non-being” at the same time. “Absolute Nothingness” is that which is
totally transcendent of everything and yet that by which everything is established. The world
that fashions itself as the self-determination of this dialectical universal is the world that
fashions itself historically and socially the world from which our self is born and to which
it returns.
IV
Nishida’s remark on the “dialectical universal” and the “Absolute Nothingness” in the above
quoted last sentence may be taken as a bluff which startles us by its singular appearance. But, the
idea at the back of these words, I surmise, shares something important with Whitehead’s concep-
tion of “God.” In the Process and Reality, Part V, Chapter Ⅱ, Section Ⅲ, Whitehead said: ‘God,
as well as being primordial, is also consequent. He is the beginning and the end.’33)
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33) In Section V, Whitehead speaks about the relation between God and the world as follows (Op. cit.,
p. 523):
‘It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that the World is permanent and
God is fluent.
It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is One and God many.
It is as true to say that, in comparison with the World, God is actual eminently, as that, in comparison
God and the World are, according to Whitehead, ‘the contrasted opposites in terms of which
Creativity achieves its Supreme task of transforming disjoined multiplicity, with its diversities in
opposition, into concrescent unity, with its diversities in contrast.’34) Thus he says: ‘The concept
of “God” is the way in which we understand this incredible fact that what cannot be, yet is.’35)
The “Supreme task” that Whitehead attributes to the “Creativity” is “that what cannot be,” that
is, “contradictory,” yet is “credible.” Thus the Whiteheadian “Creativity” is something like
Nishidan “Absolute Nothingness” as the “dialectical universal,” that is, the “topos” which is
totally transcendent of everything and yet that by which everything is established.
Now, we may safely say that such an affinity between East and West philosophers’ thoughts
was derived respectively from a common fact that both of them were, of course independently
from one another, encouraged and guided by Plato’s conception of “the third kind.”36)
Thus inspired by Plato’s original insights, especially by the conception of “topos,” A. N.
Whitehead and two Japanese philosophers, Nishida and Fujisawa Norio, though separately
from each other and in different ways, yet shared with similar and productive thought, which may
be regarded as the powerful cheer to their companions who are groping for the matrix of Truth,
Good and Beauty, i.e., the light illuminating whereabouts of our well-being in this global era.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carter , Robert E., The Nothingness beyond God, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nishida, Paragon
House, New York, 1989
Fujisawa Norio, ‘ヽ	
and Idioms of “Paradeigmatism”’ Phronesis, vol. XIX, no. 1, 1974
Fujisawa Norio, ‘Whitehead and Plato’ (Japanese) in Collected Papers of Fujisawa Norio, Iwanami, 2001
McCabe, M. M., Plato’s Individuals, Princeton University Press, 1994
桃山学院大学総合研究所紀要 第31巻第１号42
with God, the World is actual eminently.
It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the World.
It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World transcends God.
It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God.’
34) Ibid.
35) See Op. cit., p. 531.
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SUMMARY
Hideya YAMAKAWA
A. N. Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism is a typical case which testifies a fact that Plato’s
conception in the Timaeus has still an extraordinary power to provoke the modern intellects into
building their great metaphysical theories. In this paper I want to show you a fact that Japanese
philosophers Nishida and Fujisawa Norio too were enlightened by Plato’s insight. They
too, being encouraged and guided by Plato’s conception of “,” developed their original ideas.
Fujisawa presented a fresh interpretation of Plato’s later philosophy; and Nishida, a contemporary
of Whitehead, developed a bold metaphysical viewpoint which might be regarded as an achieve-
ment ranking with M. Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. Whitehead and two Japanese philosophers,
Nishida and Fujisawa Norio, though separately from each other and in different ways,
shared with similar and productive thought, which may be regarded as the powerful cheer to their
companions who are groping for the matrix of Truth, Good and Beauty, i.e., the light illuminating
whereabouts of our well-being in this global era.
